Esquecimento: uma contribuição fenomenológico-hermenêutica

Abstract

The tópos of forgetting permeates Heidegger’s work in a decisive manner. From early investigations into the dynamics of factical life up until later meditations regarding the event of appropriation, forgetting is declared to be a fundamental phenomenon by the author. A well-known formulation included at the beginning of Being and time points out to the forgetfulness of the question of the meaning of being as the starting point for the retrieval of an ontological reflection. Besides, notions such as self-consciousness and temporality are introduced by Heidegger along with specific types of forgetting within the horizon of his existential analytic. However, despite its acknowledged relevance, we are still not able to find detailed elaborations of the structures of forgetting and its connexion with further central elements of Heidegger’s work. The aim of this work is to contribute to filling this gap through the exposition and reconstruction of the concept of forgetting as it was introduced by Heidegger within the horizon of the existential analytic of Dasein. Its general purpose is to demonstrate how the acknowledgement of the dynamics of oblivion as a constitutive aspect of Dasein’s way of being allows for relevant distinctions concerning its agentive and reflexive structures.