Patent Quality and Pro-patent Policy

dc.creatorArai,Koki
dc.date2010-12-01
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-07T16:33:20Z
dc.date.available2017-03-07T16:33:20Z
dc.identifierhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242010000400001
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/403588
dc.descriptionThis paper analyzes the patent examination and litigation process in terms of a simple Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium model, and interprets the results in line with real pro-patent trends in the US and other countries. Each country's pro-patent policy option is different from the other because of reflecting its own path-dependent patent situation. That is, when a country adopts an easy patent policy (a pro-patent policy), firms in the country gain larger payoffs in the short term. Hence, every country seeks to adopt an easy patent policy. However, the easy patent policy undermines the true invention incentive. In this situation, it is difficult for any country to escape the problem, depending on the historical inertia.
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageen
dc.publisherUniversidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
dc.sourceJournal of technology management & innovation v.5 n.4 2010
dc.subjectpatent quality
dc.subjectPerfect Bayesian Equilibrium
dc.subjectpro-patent policy
dc.titlePatent Quality and Pro-patent Policy
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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