dc.creatorAtria, F.
dc.date2008-03-07T16:45:45Z
dc.date2008-03-07T16:45:45Z
dc.date1999
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-07T14:45:21Z
dc.date.available2017-03-07T14:45:21Z
dc.identifierLaw and Philosophy 18 (5): 537-577
dc.identifier0167-5249
dc.identifierhttp://dspace.utalca.cl/handle/1950/4602
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/372280
dc.descriptionAtria, F. Faculty of Law, Universidad de Talca, P.O. Box 747, Talca, Chile.
dc.descriptionThis article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them.
dc.format2974 bytes
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageen
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlands
dc.subjectapplication of law; appropriateness; clear cases; deductive reasoning;legal positivism; legal reasoning; open texture
dc.titleLegal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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