dc.creatorTroncoso Valverde, Christian
dc.creatorRobert, Jacques
dc.date2005-05-27T22:32:44Z
dc.date2005-05-27T22:32:44Z
dc.date2004
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-07T14:31:20Z
dc.date.available2017-03-07T14:31:20Z
dc.identifierhttp://dspace.utalca.cl/handle/1950/1153
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/368467
dc.description18 p.
dc.descriptionThis paper extends the traditional Hotelling’s model of spatial competition by allowing firms to choose the degree of general purposeness of their products before they compete in prices. The degree of general purposeness is approximated by endogenizing the per–unit transportation cost coefficients. The game presents a continuum of perfect Nash equilibria featuring no price competition. In equilibrium, firms behave as ‘specialist’ by choosing high transportation cost coefficients. This allows them to extract all the marginal consumer’s rent and to perfectly segment the market. Moreover, market is entirely served by both firms regardless the value of the consumer’s reservation price.
dc.format941840 bytes
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagees
dc.publisherUniversidad de Talca (Chile). Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales
dc.relationWorking Paper Series;Año 2, no. 3
dc.subjectSpatial competition, general purpose products, differentiated products.
dc.subjectJEL Classification: L11, L13, D43.
dc.titleOn hotelling's competition with general purpose products
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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