masterThesis
Diseño de un mecanismo de gobierno para coordinar las compras de un productor a sus proveedores dentro de una cadena de suministro
Fecha
2019-03-02Registro en:
Bhattacharyya, K., & Guiffrida, A. L. (2015). An optimization framework for improving supplier
delivery performance. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 39, 3771-3783.
Cao, E., Ma, Y., Wan, C., & Lai, M. (2013). Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a
dual-channel supply chain. Operations Research Letters, 410-414.
Cueto, D. (2013). Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in
Latin America. International Review of Economics and Finance, 25, 310 -325.
Dai, Y., & Chao, X. (2016). Price delegation and sales force contract design with asymmetric
risk aversion coefficient of sales agents. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 31-42.
Ducassy, I., & Guyot, A. (2017). Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm
performance: The French context. Research in International Business and Finance, 39,
291-306.
García Alcaraz, J. L., Alvarado Iniesta, A., & Maldonado Macías, A. A. (2013). Selección de
proveedores basada en análisis dimensional. Contaduría y Administración, 58(3), 249-
278
Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical
evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 319-414
Liu, K., & Song, H. (2017). Contract and incentive mechanism in low-carbon R&D cooperation.
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 270-283.
Norouzi, N., & Amalnick, M. S. (2016). Modified particle swarm optimization in a timedependent vehicle routing problem: minimizing fuel consumption. Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg, 121-134.
Rai, V.-K., & Kim, D.-H. (2002). Principal–agent problem: a cognitive map approach.
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 1, 174-192.
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of Agent: the Principal's Problem. The American
Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139.
Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An
institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54
Shou, Z., Zheng, X. (., & Zhu, W. (2016). Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An
institutional theory perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 38-54.
Skinner, W. (2000). Manufacturing - missing link in corporate strategy. Hardvard Business
Review, 136-145
Su, Y., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2014). Incentive Contract in Supply Chain with Asymmetric
Information. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 1-7
Vafa Arani, H., Rabbani, M., & Rafiei, H. (2016). A revenue-sharing option contract toward
coordination of supply chains. Int. J.ProductionEconomics, 42–56.
Wang, G. W., & Pallis, A. A. (2014). Incentive approaches to overcome moral hazard in port
concession agreements. Transportation Research Part E, 162-174.
Wang, X., Guo, H., & Wang, X. (2017). Supply chain contract mechanism under bilateral
information asymmetry. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 356-368.
Xiao-ning, G., & Jun, T. (2018). Multi-period incentive contract design in the agent emergency
supplies reservation strategy with asymmetric information. Computers & Industrial
Engineering, 94-102.
Xu, W. Y., Zhang, Z. J., & Gong, D. Q. (2014). Cooperative Supply Chain Management under
Asymmetric Information. School of Economics and Management, 12, 182-191.
Yang, J., & Qi, X. (2009). On the design of coordinating contracts. Int. J. Production Economics,
122, 581-594
Yoo, S. H., Kim, D., & Park, M.-S. (2015). Pricing and return policy under various supply
contracts in a closed-loop supply chain. International Journal of Production Research,
53(1), 106-126.
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate
Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective.
Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220.
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate
Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective.
Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220.
Zhang, Y., & Li, C. (2006). A Principal-Agent Approach to Incentive Mechanisms in Supply
Chains. IEEE, 358-363
Varian, H. R. (1992). Information. In Microeconomic Analysis (3rd ed., pp. 440–472).
New York, NY: Norton
Samuelson, W. F., & Marks, S. G. (2015). Managerial Economics (8th ed.). Hoboken,
NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Salanié, B. (2005). The Economics of Contracts (2nd ed.). London: MIT Press.
Macho-Stadler, I., & Pérez-Castrillo, J. D. (2001). An Introduction to the Economics of
Information: Incentives and Contracts (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Banarjee, R., Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Ray, S. (2013). Applications of agency theory in
B2B marketing: Review and future directions. In G. L. Lilien & R. Grewal (Eds.),
ISBM Handbook of Business to Business Marketing (1st ed., pp. 41–53)
271435
TE10099
Autor
Martínez Avela, Mario Ernesto
Vega Mejía, Carlos Alberto
Institución
Resumen
Este trabajo estudia el problema de coordinación de las compras entre un productor y sus proveedores, dentro de la cadena de suministro para un productor que tiene a una gama diversa de productos. La relación entre el productor y sus proveedores se ve como un problema de Principal-Agente, en donde el productor es el principal y los proveedores los agentes. El problema se define bajo condiciones de información asimétrica, generando un problema de selección adversa en donde los proveedores poseen más información que el productor. Para resolver esta situación se diseñó un mecanismo de gobierno (contrato con incentivos) para alinear los intereses de las partes involucradas utilizando un modelo de optimización. La solución del modelo propuesto determina las condiciones del contrato con incentivos, en términos de la combinación entre la cantidad de materias primas que el productor solicita a sus proveedores y el precio esperado que está dispuesto a pagar el productor.