The legacy of the Pinochet regime

dc.contributorGrupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosario
dc.creatorGonzález, Felipe
dc.creatorPrem, Mounu
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-05T20:23:10Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-22T15:08:12Z
dc.date.available2021-08-05T20:23:10Z
dc.date.available2022-09-22T15:08:12Z
dc.date.created2021-08-05T20:23:10Z
dc.date.issued2021-08-05
dc.identifierhttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/32152
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_32152
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3445376
dc.description.abstractChile has experienced more than thirty years of democracy at the shadow of the seventeen-year dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). This chapter provides an overview of the dictatorial legacies with an emphasis on the distribution of economic and political power, as viewed from the most recent literature in economics. We also describe the waves of discontent which have attempted to suppress the most important legacies during the past twenty years. We end with a discussion of the current path of institutional change that could put Pinochet’s legacy to an end.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisherFacultad de Economía
dc.relationDocumentos de trabajo economía, (2021); 31 pp.
dc.relationhttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/019446.html
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAbierto (Texto Completo)
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dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectElementos de continuidad y cambio en Chile
dc.subjectAnálisis de las practicas políticas dictatoriales en democracias post dictaduras
dc.subjectElites políticas y sociales en Chile
dc.subjectCambios institucionales post dictadura en Chile
dc.titleThe legacy of the Pinochet regime
dc.typeworkingPaper


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