La visión ecológica del color: Una alternativa para superar la dicotomía sujeto-mundo

Abstract

The ontological status of color has been an issue that has occupied the agenda of various thinkers over time and has been debated from different philosophical positions. In the recent debate, neurophysiological subjectivism and computational objectivism are two different perspectives that discuss if color is a property of the world or a projection of the mind. Although they appear to be antagonistic positions, both poles of the debate maintain a common nucleus in which they coincide in the formulation of a functionalist model that accounts for the perceptual process. According to the functionalist model, perception is a process of internal representations derived from information inputs from the environment and action outputs from the subject, where it is the brain that interprets the signals received from the environment. The consequence of the functionalist model, plus the debate on the ontology of color, is the separation of the subject from the world, and the elimination of color either from the subject (objectivism) or from the world (subjectivism). In this sense, the objective of this thesis is to redefine the ontological status of color from the enactive theory to blur the barrier between subject and world on an ecological-relational perspective of perception, which considers the intricate relationship between agents-animals and the niche they inhabit.