dc.creatorRoig, Guillem
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T00:02:11Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-22T14:24:36Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T00:02:11Z
dc.date.available2022-09-22T14:24:36Z
dc.date.created2020-05-26T00:02:11Z
dc.identifier19351704
dc.identifierhttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23456
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0190
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3438507
dc.description.abstractIn an environment in which a buyer and a seller make ex-ante investments, competition among sellers can solve the hold-up problem without the design of ex-ante contracts but, in the case of low levels of competition, this may lead to inefficient investments. This paper shows that a seller invests efficiently when each seller offers latent contracts designed to exclude any other seller from trade (i. e. most intense competition). Because competition among sellers allows the buyer to appropriate part of the gains from his investment, the hold-up problem vanishes for most of the buyer's investment costs. However, the seller appropriates more than his marginal contribution to the gains from trade, and over-invests, when a group of sellers does not offer latent contracts (under less intense competition). Therefore, efficient investments can only be implemented when competition is at its most intense. © 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston 2020.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherDe Gruyter
dc.relationB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN:19351704,(2020)
dc.relationhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85082180380&doi=10.1515%2fbejte-2018-0190&partnerID=40&md5=44df4f33f4213cb38deaeb16b94b797a
dc.relationB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.titleCompetition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem
dc.typearticle


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución