dc.contributorGrupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosario
dc.creatorHarding, Robin
dc.creatorRuiz, Nelson A.
dc.creatorVargas, David
dc.creatorPrem, Mounu
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-21T15:14:27Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-22T14:19:00Z
dc.date.available2021-06-21T15:14:27Z
dc.date.available2022-09-22T14:19:00Z
dc.date.created2021-06-21T15:14:27Z
dc.date.issued2021-06-18
dc.identifierhttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/31660
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_31660
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3437663
dc.description.abstractWhile existing work has demonstrated that campaign donations can buy access to benefits such as favorable legislation and preferential contracting, we highlight another use of campaign contributions: buying forbearance. Specifically, we argue that in return for campaign contributions, Colombian mayors who rely on donor-funding (compared to those who do not) choose not to enforce sanctions against illegal deforestation activities. Using a regression discontinuity design we show that deforestation is significantly higher in municipalities that elect donor-funded as opposed to self-funded politicians. Further analysis shows that only part of this effect can be explained by differences is contracting practices by donor-funded mayors. Instead, evidence from analysis of fire clearance, and of heterogeneity in the effects according to the presence of alternative formal and informal enforcement institutions, supports the interpretation that campaign contributions buy forbearance from enforcement of environmental regulations.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisherFacultad de Economía
dc.relationhttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/019296.html
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectDonaciones de campaña
dc.subjectDeforestación
dc.subjectIndulgencia
dc.titleBuying a Blind Eye: Campaign Donations, Forbearance, and Deforestation in Colombia
dc.typeworkingPaper


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