dc.creatorTrigos Carrillo, Lina Marcela
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-11T13:22:06Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-22T14:09:55Z
dc.date.available2020-06-11T13:22:06Z
dc.date.available2022-09-22T14:09:55Z
dc.date.created2020-06-11T13:22:06Z
dc.identifier0120-338X
dc.identifierhttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/25019
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3436377
dc.description.abstractJohn Searle sets out a Theory of Intentionality of Mind, from which should be inferred a Theory of Intentionality of Meaning, under the assumption that it is the mind who imposes Intentionality to language, and not vice versa. If this is so, then it should be possible to derive from this theory an intention-based theory of meaning, and from there, the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts. This article aims to analyze the general Theory of Intentionality proposed by Searle, and prove that it is in fact possible. From such a structure will derive an Intentional Theory of Meaning based on the analysis of the intention of meaning. This analysis raises some new alternatives for Intentionality-based semantic theories.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.relationForma y Función, ISSN:0120-338X, Vol.23, No.1 (2010); pp. 89-99
dc.relation99
dc.relationNo. 1
dc.relation89
dc.relationForma y Función
dc.relationVol. 23
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectactos de habla
dc.subjectintención de significar
dc.subjectintencionalidad
dc.subjectmente
dc.subjectsemántica
dc.titleSIGNIFICADO E INTENCIONALIDAD
dc.typearticle


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