dc.creator | Trigos Carrillo, Lina Marcela | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-11T13:22:06Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-22T14:09:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-11T13:22:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-22T14:09:55Z | |
dc.date.created | 2020-06-11T13:22:06Z | |
dc.identifier | 0120-338X | |
dc.identifier | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/25019 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3436377 | |
dc.description.abstract | John Searle sets out a Theory of Intentionality of Mind, from which should be inferred a Theory of Intentionality of Meaning, under the assumption that it is the mind who imposes Intentionality to language, and not vice versa. If this is so, then it should be possible to derive from this theory an intention-based theory of meaning, and from there, the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts. This article aims to analyze the general Theory of Intentionality proposed by Searle, and prove that it is in fact possible. From such a structure will derive an Intentional Theory of Meaning based on the analysis of the intention of meaning. This analysis raises some new alternatives for Intentionality-based semantic theories. | |
dc.language | spa | |
dc.publisher | Universidad Nacional de Colombia | |
dc.relation | Forma y Función, ISSN:0120-338X, Vol.23, No.1 (2010); pp. 89-99 | |
dc.relation | 99 | |
dc.relation | No. 1 | |
dc.relation | 89 | |
dc.relation | Forma y Función | |
dc.relation | Vol. 23 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.rights | Abierto (Texto Completo) | |
dc.source | instname:Universidad del Rosario | |
dc.source | reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR | |
dc.subject | actos de habla | |
dc.subject | intención de significar | |
dc.subject | intencionalidad | |
dc.subject | mente | |
dc.subject | semántica | |
dc.title | SIGNIFICADO E INTENCIONALIDAD | |
dc.type | article | |