dc.creatorEscobar Castro, Juan Fernando
dc.creatorZhang, Qiaoxi
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-29T14:18:36Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-27T22:44:54Z
dc.date.available2021-10-29T14:18:36Z
dc.date.available2022-01-27T22:44:54Z
dc.date.created2021-10-29T14:18:36Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifierTheoretical Economics 16 (2021), 571–603
dc.identifier10.3982/TE4191
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182502
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3319348
dc.description.abstractLearning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning gives rise to the trade-off between how much information to acquire and how promptly it is reflected in the decision. We discuss implications on learning delegation for distinct organizations.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherEconometric Society
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
dc.sourceTheoretical Economics
dc.subjectPrivate learning
dc.subjectDelegation
dc.subjectDelays
dc.subjectDeadlines
dc.subjectCommitment
dc.subjectCheap talk
dc.titleDelegating learning
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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