dc.creator | Escobar Castro, Juan Fernando | |
dc.creator | Zhang, Qiaoxi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-29T14:18:36Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-01-27T22:44:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-29T14:18:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-01-27T22:44:54Z | |
dc.date.created | 2021-10-29T14:18:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier | Theoretical Economics 16 (2021), 571–603 | |
dc.identifier | 10.3982/TE4191 | |
dc.identifier | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182502 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3319348 | |
dc.description.abstract | Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated.
We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a
project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed
as the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to
the principal. We formulate learning delegation as a dynamic mechanism design
problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private
learning gives rise to the trade-off between how much information to acquire and
how promptly it is reflected in the decision. We discuss implications on learning
delegation for distinct organizations. | |
dc.language | en | |
dc.publisher | Econometric Society | |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States | |
dc.source | Theoretical Economics | |
dc.subject | Private learning | |
dc.subject | Delegation | |
dc.subject | Delays | |
dc.subject | Deadlines | |
dc.subject | Commitment | |
dc.subject | Cheap talk | |
dc.title | Delegating learning | |
dc.type | Artículos de revistas | |