dc.creatorDockendorff Valdés, Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-08T22:10:47Z
dc.date.available2021-03-08T22:10:47Z
dc.date.created2021-03-08T22:10:47Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifierBritish Journal of Politics and International Relations Volumen: 23 Número: 1 Páginas: 139-157 Sep 2020
dc.identifier10.1177/1369148120949978
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/178597
dc.description.abstractThis article offers an empirical test of why some legislators' bills are more likely to move forward in the legislative process. We argue that who signs the bill matters when it comes to the level of support that the proposal receives. Successful bills will be sponsored by a greater number of members (bandwagonfactor) and political adversaries (support across the aislefactor). On the contrary, failed initiatives will be those sponsored by inexperienced parliamentarians (newcomersfactor). We examine the case of Chile and test the expectations with legislative data on parliamentarians' bills.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherSage
dc.sourceBritish Journal of Politics and International Relations
dc.subjectBill sponsorship
dc.subjectInformation aggregation
dc.subjectIntra-legislative signalling
dc.subjectLegislative success
dc.subjectParliamentarians' bills
dc.subjectReactive legislatures
dc.titleWhy are some parliamentarians' bills more likely to progress? Sponsorship as a signal
dc.typeArtículo de revista


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