State segmentation in unequal democracies

Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of state segmentation and relates it to a causal argument for why unequal democracies survive. State segmentation describes asymmetries between the efficiency of citizenship rights for those at the top of the social spectrum and those at the bottom. The argument is that state segmentation of citizenship rights solves the elites’ dilemma when choosing whether to support or oppose democracy. Such a dilemma follows the contrast between the comparative advantage of democracies in protecting property rights and the comparative advantage of autocracies in repressing the poor, both of which are desirable attributes of a political system from the elites’ point of view. In unequal democracies with segmented states, elites enjoy both the protection granted by citizenship rights and rely on the repression of the poor due to the violation of those same rights. I test the argument using multinomial logistic regressions to predict the odds of impeachments and coups in light of different levels of state segmentation in Latin America, followed by a nested analysis of three cases of unequal democracies, two where elites continued to bet on democratic institutions despite important distributive threats (Brazil 2014-2016 and Chile 2011-2017) and one in which they decide to stage a coup (Venezuela 1999-2002)This paper introduces the concept of state segmentation and relates it to a causal argument for why unequal democracies survive. State segmentation describes asymmetries between the efficiency of citizenship rights for those at the top of the social spectrum and those at the bottom. The argument is that state segmentation of citizenship rights solves the elites’ dilemma when choosing whether to support or oppose democracy. Such a dilemma follows the contrast between the comparative advantage of democracies in protecting property rights and the comparative advantage of autocracies in repressing the poor, both of which are desirable attributes of a political system from the elites’ point of view. In unequal democracies with segmented states, elites enjoy both the protection granted by citizenship rights and rely on the repression of the poor due to the violation of those same rights. I test the argument using multinomial logistic regressions to predict the odds of impeachments and coups in light of different levels of state segmentation in Latin America, followed by a nested analysis of three cases of unequal democracies, two where elites continued to bet on democratic institutions despite important distributive threats (Brazil 2014-2016 and Chile 2011-2017) and one in which they decide to stage a coup (Venezuela 1999-2002)This paper introduces the concept of state segmentation and relates it to a causal argument for why unequal democracies survive. State segmentation describes asymmetries between the efficiency of citizenship rights for those at the top of the social spectrum and those at the bottom. The argument is that state segmentation of citizenship rights solves the elites’ dilemma when choosing whether to support or oppose democracy. Such a dilemma follows the contrast between the comparative advantage of democracies in protecting property rights and the comparative advantage of autocracies in repressing the poor, both of which are desirable attributes of a political system from the elites’ point of view. In unequal democracies with segmented states, elites enjoy both the protection granted by citizenship rights and rely on the repression of the poor due to the violation of those same rights. I test the argument using multinomial logistic regressions to predict the odds of impeachments and coups in light of different levels of state segmentation in Latin America, followed by a nested analysis of three cases of unequal democracies, two where elites continued to bet on democratic institutions despite important distributive threats (Brazil 2014-2016 and Chile 2011-2017) and one in which they decide to stage a coup (Venezuela 1999-2002)