Economic and cultural determinants of elite attitudes towards redistribution

Abstract

Previous studies posit that elites are willing to advance the redistribution of income and social goods when negative effects of inequality, such as crime and conflict, threaten their own safety. Nonetheless, elites’ willingness to tackle inequality seems to be low throughout the Global South in spite of such extreme negative consequences. Drawing on 56 in-depth interviews and closed-ended surveys with 543 political and economic elites, we document how elites’ perceptions of the poor mediate their response to threats resulting from inequality. In-depth interview data reveal that, in explaining the challenges of redistribution policies, respondents consistently characterize the poor as ignorant, uninformed, and irrational, in opposition to rational, maximizing elites. We theorize that these perceptions of the poor hinder elites’ willingness to support redistribution, even when redistribution suits protection needs. We test this relationship in random samples of elites in Brazil, South Africa, and Uruguay and find it to be robust.Previous studies posit that elites are willing to advance the redistribution of income and social goods when negative effects of inequality, such as crime and conflict, threaten their own safety. Nonetheless, elites’ willingness to tackle inequality seems to be low throughout the Global South in spite of such extreme negative consequences. Drawing on 56 in-depth interviews and closed-ended surveys with 543 political and economic elites, we document how elites’ perceptions of the poor mediate their response to threats resulting from inequality. In-depth interview data reveal that, in explaining the challenges of redistribution policies, respondents consistently characterize the poor as ignorant, uninformed, and irrational, in opposition to rational, maximizing elites. We theorize that these perceptions of the poor hinder elites’ willingness to support redistribution, even when redistribution suits protection needs. We test this relationship in random samples of elites in Brazil, South Africa, and Uruguay and find it to be robust.Previous studies posit that elites are willing to advance the redistribution of income and social goods when negative effects of inequality, such as crime and conflict, threaten their own safety. Nonetheless, elites’ willingness to tackle inequality seems to be low throughout the Global South in spite of such extreme negative consequences. Drawing on 56 in-depth interviews and closed-ended surveys with 543 political and economic elites, we document how elites’ perceptions of the poor mediate their response to threats resulting from inequality. In-depth interview data reveal that, in explaining the challenges of redistribution policies, respondents consistently characterize the poor as ignorant, uninformed, and irrational, in opposition to rational, maximizing elites. We theorize that these perceptions of the poor hinder elites’ willingness to support redistribution, even when redistribution suits protection needs. We test this relationship in random samples of elites in Brazil, South Africa, and Uruguay and find it to be robust.