DO TAX CUTS ENCOURAGE RENT SEEKING BY TOP CORPORATE EXECUTIVES? THEORY AND EVIDENCE

dc.creatorAndersen, Dana C.
dc.creatorLópez Vega, Ramón
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-30T15:30:54Z
dc.date.available2019-10-30T15:30:54Z
dc.date.created2019-10-30T15:30:54Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifierContemporary Economic Policy, Volumen 37, Issue 2, 2019, Pages 219-235
dc.identifier14657287
dc.identifier10743529
dc.identifier10.1111/coep.12278
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/172455
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking within the firm. We develop a theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent-seeking responses to income taxes, and provides a framework to estimate a lower bound for the rent-seeking response. Using executive compensation and governance data, we find that rent seeking represents an important component of the response to changes in tax rates, especially among executives in firms with the worst corporate governance. (JEL D31, G30, H21).
dc.languageen
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Inc.
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
dc.sourceContemporary Economic Policy
dc.subjectBusiness, Management and Accounting (all)
dc.subjectEconomics and Econometrics
dc.subjectPublic Administration
dc.titleDO TAX CUTS ENCOURAGE RENT SEEKING BY TOP CORPORATE EXECUTIVES? THEORY AND EVIDENCE
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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