Strategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: an equivalence

dc.creatorRomero Medina, Antonio
dc.creatorTriossi, Matteo
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-11T17:29:58Z
dc.date.available2019-10-11T17:29:58Z
dc.date.created2019-10-11T17:29:58Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifierInternational Journal of Economic Theory (2020) 349-354
dc.identifier17427363
dc.identifier17427355
dc.identifier10.1111/ijet.12214
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/171208
dc.description.abstractWe prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems withmulti-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
dc.sourceInternational Journal of Economic Theory
dc.sourceInternational Journal of Economic Theory
dc.subjectGroup strategy-proofness
dc.subjectMulti-unit demand
dc.subjectStability
dc.subjectStrategy-proofness
dc.titleStrategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: an equivalence
dc.typeArtículo de revista


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