Artículo de revista
Effects of asymmetric information on airport congestion management mechanisms
Fecha
2019Registro en:
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volumen 62, 2019, Pages 4-27
01677187
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.07.007
Autor
Aravena, Olivia
Basso, Leonardo
Figueroa, Nicolás
Institución
Resumen
We study and compare three different mechanisms for capacity (slot) allocation in a congested airport when airlines
have one-dimensional private information: direct allocation of
slots, differentiated tolls and slot auctions. With perfect information, direct allocation is a first best policy which can
be implemented through Pigouvian taxes or slot auctions; the
mechanisms are equivalent in terms of social welfare. With
the introduction of asymmetric information this equivalence
is lost: direct allocation is always ex-post inefficient and, in
some cases, tolls and subsequent quantity delegation is a better alternative social welfare wise. Auctions may be superior
or inferior to tolls. We further show that naïve application
of Pigouvian tolls is sub-optimal when imperfect information
exists.