Enrutamiento Seguro y Escalable en Redes Móviles Ad Hoc

Abstract

In the context of routing in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), one of the most challenging problems is the implementation of security policies and mechanisms capable of securing the communication among the nodes in the network. In general, the attacks to the MANETs can be classified into one of two classes: Denial of service (consumption of resources) or against the routing protocols. In this work we present the On-demand Secure Distance Vector Protocol (OSDV) which implements a series of security mechanisms aimed to prevent attacks against routing such as nodes reporting a fake shorter distance to the destination, a node pretending that he is the destination, nodes forging destination sequence numbers and a more subtle attack where nodes pretend that they are one hop closer to the destination (one-hop attacks). The security mechanisms implemented in OSDV are hash chains that are used to secure the mutable fields in the control signaling, digital signatures to secure the identity of the nodes as well as the immutable control fields, and time ordering to prevent one-hop attacks. All these techniques have been used in the past, but OSDV integrates all of them in a single protocol. As shown by our simulation experiments, when using these techniques, the nodes that compose a MANET are capable of discovering, establishing and maintaining secure routes from sources to destination, even in the presence of a set of adversary nodes. We performed a series of simulation experiments where we compare the performance of our protocol against that of AODV which is a de facto standard for routing in MANETs. Our experiments show that OSDV is much more resilient to attacks than AODV.