| dc.description.abstract | This study is aimed to verify the problems arising from the contributions misuse for social security through the Untying Revenue Union (URU). Similarly it is shown in this study the concentration of tax resources in the Union, damaging other federal entities. Initially, we historically analyzed federalism, relating it to the tax matter, emphasizing the importance of constitutional discrimination rents. Then, we came to approach more specifically the tax powers and revenue sharing among federal agencies. In the sequel, we started to analyze the constitutional system of contributions to Social Security and its characterization in the tax system. Finally, following the approach of these concepts, it presents the Untying mechanism of Union Revenues, created by EC 27/2000. The contributions to social security were included in the 1988 Federal Constitution, specifically in art. 195, in order to finance the areas of healthcare and welfare. However, the social purpose of this tax has been deflected by a budgetary mechanism called Untying Revenue Union (URU), which allows the decoupling of 20% of revenue from taxes and social contributions. Thus, part of the resources that should be applied to those aforementioned social areas is being allocated for different purposes. This undermines the effectiveness of these social rights. On the other hand, there is a growing increase in the institution of this exaction, with only revenue collection stamp. This is because the contributions to social security are Union exclusive competence for the institution and do not enter into revenue sharing with other federal entities. For this study, we used the deductive method of approach. The methods of procedure used the historical method, comparative and monograph. | |
