A aprioridade do espaço no primeiro argumento da exposição metafísica (Crítica da Razão Pura, A23/B38)

Abstract

This dissertation aims to expose the interpretational controversies about the argument of the apriority of the space representation in Critique of Pure Reason. In this work, Kant presented two arguments that aim to prove the apriority of the space representation. These arguments can be found in the section titled Transcendental Aesthetics, section of the work that aims at describing the contributions a priori of the sensibility in the human knowledge on objects. In the Transcendental Aesthetics we find the subsection that is supposed to prove that the representation from space is pure intuition. For such purposes, Kant formulated two arguments in order to prove that the original representation of space is the priori, the two first arguments; also, plus two arguments that aim to prove that it is an intuition. The two first arguments (arguments to prove the apriority of the space representation) were object of many controversies, and this dissertation develops upon these controversies. Firstly, I present an interpretation model well widespread of these arguments, represented by Kemp Smith (1923). These authors considered that the first argument to prove that the representation from space was enough for such proof, given that it comprised some sort of redundancy and, for this reason, proved too much, in this way, he affirmed that the two arguments constituted one only proof in two steps. Against this interpretation came two interpretations of Strawson (1966) and Allison (1983). Strawson (1966) states that the first argument to prove the apriority of the representation from space presents a condition for which we are capable of recognizing singularities about general concepts. Allison (1983) states that in the first argument for the space apriority Kant is showing that space is a necessary epistemic condition – a mean or a vehicle – for the individuation of our perceptions of objects. This interpretation is possible from an unusual reading of a term used in the first argument “außer”, which means “out”. Allison (1983) states that in the first argument to prove the apriority of the space representation the term “außer” means “distinct”. Strawson’s reading (1966) does not disagrees with Allison’s (1983) in this specific aspect. In this way, both authors treat the first argument of the apriority of space representation as a condition that allow us to individuate the representations that we report on objects. In this point, both interpretations are very similar, and for this reason, I call the exegesis of the first argument of the apriority as interpretative model Allison-Strawson. Warren (1999) recently presented one interpretation which meets the interpretative model Allison-Strawson. He states that in the first argument to prove the apriority of space representation, Kant gives a spatial meaning to the term “außer”. Warren (1999) shows how this reading is possible, moreover, how it does not comprises any tautology and is more adequate to the own literariness of Kant’s text. It is on this stir that the present dissertation is built on. In the third chapter Warren’s reading (1999) endorses showing how a more adequate reading to the first argument of the apriority of space representation in Critique of Pure Reason.