Democracia para quem? O cinismo institucionalizado nas lógicas de financiamento empresarial de campanhas eleitorais

Abstract

The following essay aims to analyse the electoral campaign donations of the companies and its relation to the democratic principle. Beyond the appreciation of the constitutionality of the companies campaign donations, the research intend to investigate the dissimilar theory that study the building of the democratic principle and its place in the Constitution of the Republic of Brazil; to understand the historical formation process of the Brazilian politic class; to analyse, based on data extracted from other authors, whether the Brazilian normative system about companies campaign donations may affect the public interest materialized by the legislation power; to analyse if the public interest may be polarized with the private interests considering the financial participation of companies in the electoral processes; to investigate if there is a tension between the Three Branches of Government about the subject of companies electoral campaign donations and their relation to the democratic principle. In order to achieve this objetives, first it is delimitated a theoretical reference dialectic, with fundamental conceptions that oriented the research, and it is studied the historic-politic formation of Brazil, focusing specially about citizenship and the relation between public and private interests on the diverse configuration given in and by the Government. In the second chapter, it is analysed specifically the historic of law concerned to the electoral campaign donations, as well presented the empirics studies already produced that try to connect the nature of rent-seeking applied to the companies donations; at end, the study focus in the institutional dialogues between the Three Branches of Government about this subjet, specially the recent judgment in the Brazilian Suprem Court (ADI 4650) concluded in 2015 that declared unconstitucional the Brazilian law that allow companies campaing donations. The conclusions converge to the antidemocratic side of the concentration of campaign donations origined in few companies and the need to think new ways to subcontract public services in order to prevent electoral corruption.