Article (Journal/Review)
Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
Fecha
2008-06Registro en:
0167-4544 / 1573-0697
10.1007/s00199-007-0249-0
000254087700001
Mat, Inct/K-2187-2013
Autor
Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
Castro, Luciano Irineu de
Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Institución
Resumen
Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.