dc.contributorFGV
dc.creatorAraújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
dc.creatorCastro, Luciano Irineu de
dc.creatorMoreira, Humberto Ataíde
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-10T13:35:40Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T14:00:41Z
dc.date.available2018-05-10T13:35:40Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T14:00:41Z
dc.date.created2018-05-10T13:35:40Z
dc.date.issued2008-06
dc.identifier0167-4544 / 1573-0697
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/23093
dc.identifier10.1007/s00199-007-0249-0
dc.identifier000254087700001
dc.identifierMat, Inct/K-2187-2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2689071
dc.description.abstractDiscontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relationEconomic theory
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.sourceWeb of Science
dc.subjectAuctions
dc.subjectPure strategy equilibria
dc.subjectNon-monotonic bidding functions
dc.subjectTie-breaking rules
dc.subjectNecessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium
dc.subjectMultidimensional types
dc.subjectDiscontinuous games
dc.subjectEquilibrium
dc.titleNon-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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