dc.creatorCouyoumdjian, Juan Pablo
dc.creatorLondregan, John Benedict
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-05T23:51:48Z
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-17T14:39:38Z
dc.date.available2016-10-05T23:51:48Z
dc.date.available2019-05-17T14:39:38Z
dc.date.created2016-10-05T23:51:48Z
dc.date.issued2012-08
dc.identifierLegislative Studies Quarterly, 2012, vol. 37, n°3, p. 355-388
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00051.x
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11447/752
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2674692
dc.description.abstractIn Chile's two-member legislative districts we show there are two groups of swing voters, one group for the first seat won by the governing coalition, another for the second. We build a model that allows us to identify the relative prevalence of these voters across communities. Using data on the allocation of discretionary agricultural loans, we find that communities with relatively many voters pivotal for the first seat receive more loans than they otherwise would have, but we find no systematic advantage for districts that are pivotal for the second seat.
dc.languageen_US
dc.subjectPork-Barrel
dc.subjectRedistributive politics
dc.subjectProportional representation
dc.subjectBuying supermajorities
dc.subjectIncome-redistribution
dc.subjectElectoral-college
dc.subjectGovernment
dc.subjectElections
dc.subjectEconomy
dc.subjectExpenditures
dc.titleCultivating Votes in Rural Chile
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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