dc.creatorKalashnikov, Vitaly
dc.creatorKalashnykova, Nataliya
dc.date2008
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-06T12:10:39Z
dc.date.available2017-03-06T12:10:39Z
dc.identifierhttp://eprints.uanl.mx/7691/1/A%20Strategic%20Model%20of%20European%20Gas%20Supply.pdf
dc.identifierKalashnikov, Vitaly y Kalashnykova, Nataliya (2008) A strategic model of european gas supply. International business & economics research journal, 7 (5). pp. 43-50. ISSN 1535-0754
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/250241
dc.descriptionStructural changes in the European natural gas market such as liberalization, increasing domestic demand, and increasing import dependency have triggered new attempts to model these markets accurately. In this paper, we propose an exhaustive model of the European natural gas supply including the possibility of strategic behaviour of the agents along the value-added chain. We structure it as a two-stage-game with natural gas exports to Europe (first stage) and wholesale trade within Europe (second stage). The case of non-cooperative Cournot competition at both stages proves to be the most realistic scenario. The results of the perfect competition and cartel scenario are also presented. Our results suggest that the main suppliers of natural gas to Europe (Russia, Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway) remain dominant, but that they are complemented by overseas supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The model also enables us to identify transport infrastructure bottlenecks where transport capacity constraints are binding.
dc.formattext
dc.languageen
dc.publisherWestern Academic Press
dc.relationhttp://eprints.uanl.mx/7691/
dc.rightscc_by_nc_nd
dc.subjectHB Teorías Económicas, Demografía
dc.titleA strategic model of european gas supply
dc.typeArtículos de revistas
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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