dc.creatorNoton Norambuena, Carlos
dc.creatorElberg, Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-14T18:15:32Z
dc.date.available2018-09-14T18:15:32Z
dc.date.created2018-09-14T18:15:32Z
dc.date.issued2018-05
dc.identifierThe Economic Journal, 128 (May), 1304–1330
dc.identifier10.1111/ecoj.12423
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/151695
dc.description.abstractConventional wisdom is that big-box retailers squeeze the profits of small suppliers. Underlying this belief is the assumption that relative market size is the primary source of bargaining leverage. Using actual wholesale prices, we study profit-sharing between large retailers and suppliers of different size. We find that the median supplier earns 42% of the channel surplus, and that some very small suppliers attain a share of the channel surplus close to that of the largest supplier (about 68%). Using a Nash bargaining model, we find that small suppliers can gain bargaining leverage by maintaining a base of loyal customers.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
dc.sourceThe Economic Journal
dc.subjectBuyer power
dc.subjectPerformance
dc.subjectMarket
dc.subjectManufacturers
dc.subjectMaintenance
dc.subjectEquilibrium
dc.subjectIncentives
dc.subjectInference
dc.subjectRetailers
dc.subjectIndustry
dc.titleAre supermarkets squeezing small suppliers? evidence from negotiated wholesale prices
dc.typeArtículo de revista


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