dc.creator | Bauducco, Sofía | |
dc.creator | Janiak, Alexandre | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-29T22:00:27Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-29T22:00:27Z | |
dc.date.created | 2018-05-29T22:00:27Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier | Macroeconomic Dynamics Vol.21 (8): 2158-2169 | |
dc.identifier | 10.1017/S1365100516000067 | |
dc.identifier | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/148318 | |
dc.description.abstract | We show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages. | |
dc.language | en | |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | |
dc.source | Macroeconomic Dynamics | |
dc.subject | Minimum Wage | |
dc.subject | Employment | |
dc.subject | Search | |
dc.subject | Large Firm | |
dc.title | A note on the large-firm matching model: can a nonbinding minimum wage reduce wages and employment? | |
dc.type | Artículo de revista | |