dc.creatorBauducco, Sofía
dc.creatorJaniak, Alexandre
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-29T22:00:27Z
dc.date.available2018-05-29T22:00:27Z
dc.date.created2018-05-29T22:00:27Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifierMacroeconomic Dynamics Vol.21 (8): 2158-2169
dc.identifier10.1017/S1365100516000067
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/148318
dc.description.abstractWe show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.sourceMacroeconomic Dynamics
dc.subjectMinimum Wage
dc.subjectEmployment
dc.subjectSearch
dc.subjectLarge Firm
dc.titleA note on the large-firm matching model: can a nonbinding minimum wage reduce wages and employment?
dc.typeArtículo de revista


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