dc.creator | González Tissinetti, Aldo | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-09T16:24:24Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-09T16:24:24Z | |
dc.date.created | 2017-06-09T16:24:24Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier | Series Documentos de Trabajo, No. 271 Diciembre, 2007 | |
dc.identifier | https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/144301 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies how the use of divestiture in merger control can
affect the revelation of information about the level of efficiency gains
that a proposed merger carries. We show that a decision policy that
uses costly divestiture as a screening instrument presents superior
results respect to a blind policy where the decision is based only on a
priori beliefs about the level of efficiency gains. This new optimal policy
eliminates type I error -allowing inefficient mergers- and mitigates type
II error -rejecting good mergers-. If efficiency gains take place in the
divested markets as well, an “informational” efficiency offense
argument may arise, forcing the competition authority not to the
disclose all the level of information desired if this jeopardizes the
feasibility of the remedy. | |
dc.language | en | |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Economía y Negocios | |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile | |
dc.source | Series Documentos de Trabajo | |
dc.subject | Merger Control | |
dc.subject | Efficiency Gains | |
dc.subject | Asymmetry of Information | |
dc.subject | Divestiture | |
dc.title | Divestitures and the screening of efficiency gains in merger control | |
dc.type | Documento de trabajo | |