Artículos de revistas
A game-theoretical approach for policing decision support
Fecha
2016Registro en:
European Journal of Applied Mathematics Volumen: 27 Páginas: 338-356 Jun 2016
10.1017/S0956792515000480
Autor
Espejo, G.
L'Huillier, G.
Weber, Richard
Institución
Resumen
Recently, many security-related problems have gained increasing attention from a quantitative
perspective. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical approach to model the interaction
between police forces and delinquents in public places. In the well-known Stackelberg game, a
leader is faced with only one follower. However, in our application, the police are simultaneously
faced with many offenders, who may be organized or act independently of each other. This
application motivates the development of two games: a classical leader-follower interaction
between police and organized criminals on the one hand and a novel approach between the leader
and selfishly acting offenders on the other. It is of special interest that the effect of crime
displacement under police surveillance be anticipated by the proposed models. Results using data
from a simulated environment emphasise how these models can provide decision support for
policing outperforming traditional strategies.