Artículo de revista
Markets for enviromental protection: design and performance
Fecha
2004-06Registro en:
Estudios de economía. Vol.31 No.1 Junio 2004 Pags. 79-99
Autor
Montero, Juan Pablo
Institución
Resumen
Policy makers in different parts of the world are paying more attention to environmental
markets (i.e., tradeable permits markets) as an alternative to the
traditional command-and-command control approach of setting uniform emission
and technology standards. I extend the basic (perfect information) model
of a permits market to accommodate for practical considerations including
regulator’s asymmetric information on firms’ costs, uncertainty on benefits from
pollution control, incomplete enforcement, incomplete monitoring of emissions
and the possibility of voluntary participation of non-affected sources. Implications
for instrument design and implementation are provided.