dc.date.accessioned2018-09-28T18:18:54Z
dc.date.available2018-09-28T18:18:54Z
dc.date.created2018-09-28T18:18:54Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10533/220710
dc.identifier1131096
dc.identifierWOS:000392792900004
dc.description.abstractRetail competition today can be described by three main features: (i) oligopolistic competition, (ii) multi-store settings, and (iii) the presence of large economies of scale. In these markets, firms usually apply a centralized decisions making process in order to take full advantage of economies of scales, e.g. retail distribution centers. In this paper, we model and analyze the stability and chaos of retail competition considering all these issues. In particular, a dynamic multi-market Cournot Nash equilibrium with global economies and diseconomies of scale model is developed. We confirm the non-intuitive hypothesis that retail multi-store competition is more unstable than traditional small business that cover the same demand. The main sources of stability are the scale parameter, the number of markets, and the number of firms. (C) 2016 International Association for Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (IMACS). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords. Author Keywords:Multi-market oligopoly; Cournot-Nash competition; Economies of scale; Stability; Chaos
dc.languageeng
dc.relationhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378475416301793
dc.relation10.1016/j.matcom.2016.09.011
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement//1131096
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/dataset/hdl.handle.net/10533/93477
dc.relationinstname: Conicyt
dc.relationreponame: Repositorio Digital RI2.0
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
dc.titleDynamics and stability in retail competition
dc.typeArticulo


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