Public-Private-Co-operation in Regulatory Reform: Consequenceas and Results After a Decade of Environmental Policies in Chile.

Abstract

Over the last three decades public-private co-operation has become an international phenomenon applied to a wide range of traditional state provided services and functions. This has been the consequence of a policy reform wave that at its core challenges the capacity of the nation state to address salient societal problems. In regulatory policies, the classical notion of a controlling, hierarchical and discretional government represents the failing paradigm, whereas other modes of governance, characterised mainly by a cooperative, consensus-oriented relationship between the government and the private sector, are being developed and promoted worldwide. By examining the environmental reform implemented in Chile during the 1990s, this thesis aims to develop a better understanding about the emergence, use, and impacts of public-private co-operation in regulatory reform. In doing so, it uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative rnethods to examine two inter-related unes of enquiry. Firstly, it studies the political and institutional context from which the co-operative approach developed in post-dictatorial Chile. Secondly, it takes public-private cooperation to the test by assessing the impact of voluntary environmental agreernents in this country. The findings suggest that there were a number of political and institutional conditions that created the need for co-operation in both the public and private sector. Most notably, that the new democratic administration, in the afterrnath of Pinochet's government, had to tackle several critical pollution issues across the country, but in so doing it needed the cornrnitment and resources of the private sector. At the same time, businesses had to take serious consideration of environmental matters in order to consolidate the successful export-oriented development strategy adopted in the country in the 198os. Moreover, the research identifies several institutional rules that determine both the formation and functioning of co-operation through networks of decision-making. Features such as corporatisrn, a consensual and informal style of negotiation between the government and industry, and the dominance of a technocratic culture, among others, facilitate governrnent and industry collaboration. Simultaneously, technocracy and the paternalistic style of negotiation used by the government with civil society organisations, restrain the capacity of the latter to influence public policy-making. Finaily, the assessrnent of voluntary agreements shows that the overall impact of this instrument has been positive in terms of prornoting environmental improvements within the participant facilities. The findings imply that voluntary agreements played a significant role in triggering the implementation of several initiatives of an incremental nature. Moreover, there were as well sorne radical improvernents such as the developrnent of radical process changes, even in small- and medium-sized enterprises, which has a striking importance for the debates on governance and regulatory reforrn. Furtherrnore, the analysis confirrns not only that co-operative governance structures suffer from regulatory capture, but also that capture can co-exist with significant environmental irnprovements, which shed light on the broader debates surrounding the use of public-private co-operation in regulatory reform.