Magíster en EconomíaTesis digital no disponible, consulte la versión impresa en Biblioteca de la Universidad Alberto HurtadoThe development of an auction system in the Chilean Sea Bass industry is characterized by few competitors and presents a unique natural experiment on which a government regulation of fishing rights may have failed in to encourage the appropriate level of competition. Although the present paper does not provide a formal model on how collusion may have taken place, it makes a strong case for the sustainability of such a system. We find that auction prices were low when no entry was attempted but prices spiked when there was entry, for example, relative to earlier auctions, prices during the third auction were 6 to 18 times that of the first and second auction. We also find that there is strong evidence for coordination between incumbents in the form of market sharing – in which incumbents seemingly bought fishing rights so as to maintain proportional market shares. All in all, the analysis here should be of great use to a reader of antitrust economics – especially a government regulator who suspects that there is lack of competition in the auction for government permits.