| dc.creator | Li Ning, Jorge | |
| dc.creator | Willington, Manuel | |
| dc.date | 2015-04-02T22:41:08Z | |
| dc.date | 2015-04-02T22:41:08Z | |
| dc.date | 2009 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-04-19T21:15:56Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-04-19T21:15:56Z | |
| dc.identifier | Documentos de Investigación 239: 2009, p. 1-25 | |
| dc.identifier | http://repositorio.uahurtado.cl/handle/11242/6696 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1373738 | |
| dc.description | This paperís purpose is to study the problem of a regulator of a utility monopoly,
who has a universal service goal that is binding, in the sense that there is no twopart
tari§ that can induce e¢ cient consumption, self-Önance the Örm, and guarantee
universal access at the same time.
The optimal two-part tari§s that the regulator should set under the following three
di§erent regulatory rules are derived: no áexibility (the monopolist just o§ers the
regulated plan), partial áexibility (the monopolist can o§er alternative plans, but these
-and the regulated one- must be available to all customers), and full áexibility (the
regulated plan must be available to all customers, but not the alternative ones).
The solutions under the three schemes are characterized, and provide an unambiguous
ranking of regulatory rules: total áexibility is weakly better than partial áexibility,
with the latter being strictly better than no áexibility. | |
| dc.language | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios | |
| dc.subject | Monopoly regulation | |
| dc.subject | network utilities | |
| dc.subject | universal service obligation | |
| dc.subject | NonLinear Tariffs | |
| dc.title | Regulating a Monopoly with Universal Service Obligation: The Role of Flexible Tariff Schemes | |
| dc.type | Artículos de revistas | |
