dc.creatorTejada, Mauricio
dc.date2015-03-12T23:46:45Z
dc.date2015-03-12T23:46:45Z
dc.date2013
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-19T21:15:45Z
dc.date.available2018-04-19T21:15:45Z
dc.identifierDocumentos de Investigación 295: 2013, p. 1-49
dc.identifierhttp://repositorio.uahurtado.cl/handle/11242/6641
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1373683
dc.descriptionTemporary contracts, as well as labor protection, have been used to reduce unemployment with the latter leading to fewer job destructions. This paper estimates a search and matching model with labor protection and dual labor markets in which the use of temporary contracts is endogenous. Chilean data is used to evaluate the role of labor protection legislation and the use of temporary contracts in unemployment, welfare, and inequality. Results indicate that both types of contracts survive in equilibrium. Temporary contracts negatively affect the frequency with which regular jobs arrive, offsetting any positive effect of firing costs on unemployment. Temporary contracts increase flexibility but welfare gains are observed only if labor protection is very stringent.
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherUniversidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
dc.subjectTemporary jobs
dc.subjectlabor protection
dc.subjectsearch models
dc.subjectmaximum likelihood estimation
dc.subjectstructural estimation
dc.titleDual Labor Markets and Labor Protection in an Estimated Search and Matching Model
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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