dc.creatorBonifaz, José Luis
dc.date2014-07-31T21:25:00Z
dc.date2014-07-31T21:25:00Z
dc.date1998
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-19T21:04:00Z
dc.date.available2018-04-19T21:04:00Z
dc.identifierRevista de Análisis Económico 13(1): 1998, p. 117-148
dc.identifier0716-5927
dc.identifiereISSN 0718-8870
dc.identifierhttp://repositorio.uahurtado.cl/handle/11242/1726
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1370750
dc.descriptionThe purpose of this work is to present some recommendations regarding the concession of roadways to take place in Peru in the coming years. The Road Systems Concessions Program's scheme comprises the granting of approximately 7.000 km of roadway. Two of the methods used to define the auction variable are analyzed. Minimum Toll (fixed term), and Least Present Value of Income (variable term). Auction Theory is utilized and, on this basis, an auction mechanism is designed. In this sense the proposal includes: a) the auctioning in the first place, of the most profitable systems in a sequential manner, the objective being that both the auctioneer and the concessionaire companies may master the process. b) The auctioning of the systems, by way of a closed-envelope by turns auction. c) The simultanous auctioning, of those road packages where the benefits granted by synergies present are superior to organizational costs; in this case the participants may make simultaneous offers for various road segments under concession. In this manner, advantage can be taken of possible scale economies, and market concentration will be limited.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherILADES; Georgetown University; Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
dc.rightsAttribution 3.0 Unported
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subjectConcesiones -- Perú
dc.subjectCarreteras -- Perú
dc.titleConcesiones de Carreteras: Recomendaciones para el Caso Peruano
dc.typeArtículos de revistas


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