| dc.creator | Panagariya, Arvind | |
| dc.creator | Schiff, Maurice | |
| dc.date | 2014-07-31T21:16:54Z | |
| dc.date | 2014-07-31T21:16:54Z | |
| dc.date | 1995 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-04-19T21:03:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-04-19T21:03:42Z | |
| dc.identifier | Revista de Análisis Económico 10(1): 1995, p. 19-35 | |
| dc.identifier | 0716-5927 | |
| dc.identifier | eISSN 0718-8870 | |
| dc.identifier | | |
| dc.identifier | http://repositorio.uahurtado.cl/handle/11242/1674 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/1370698 | |
| dc.description | The traditional literature derives optimum and revenue-maximizing export taxes within two-country models. with one exporter and one importer (Johnson 1950-51, Tower 1977). In reality, most products, including primary products. are exported by several countries. In this paper, we present a theory of trade taxes in a three-country framework. This enables us to deal with strategic interactions among exporting countries. We show that (i) if one of the countries is a Stackelberg leader, both countries improve their welfare relative to Nash equilibrium, and in the symmetric case, the follower's welfare is higher than that of the leader; (ii) the revenue-maximizing Nash tax is larger than the optimum tax for each country; and (iii) welfare may be higher in the revenue-maximizing Nash equilibrium than in the welfare-maximizing Nash equilibrium, a result which cannot arise in two-country models. | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ILADES; Georgetown University; Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios | |
| dc.rights | Attribution 3.0 Unported | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Impuestos | |
| dc.subject | Exportaciones | |
| dc.subject | Comercio | |
| dc.subject | Bienestar social | |
| dc.title | Optimun and Revenue Maximizing Trade Taxes in a Multicountry Framework | |
| dc.type | Artículos de revistas | |
