| dc.creator | Jara, Mauricio | |
| dc.creator | López, Félix J. | |
| dc.date | 2015-11-23T19:59:01Z | |
| dc.date | 2015-11-23T19:59:01Z | |
| dc.date | 2011 | |
| dc.identifier | Journal of CENTRUM Cathedra, Volume 4, issue 1, (Mar 2011): 100-120 | |
| dc.identifier | 1851-6599 | |
| dc.identifier | http://repositoriodigital.ucsc.cl/handle/25022009/440 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.7835/jcc-berj-2011-0053 | |
| dc.description | Artículo | |
| dc.description | In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals. | |
| dc.language | en | |
| dc.publisher | Emerald | |
| dc.rights | Atribucion-Nocomercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
| dc.source | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1807171 | |
| dc.subject | Corporate control | |
| dc.subject | Discretionary accruals | |
| dc.subject | Earnings management | |
| dc.subject | Family firms | |
| dc.title | Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms | |
| dc.type | Artículos de revistas | |
