We propose an evolutionary game with dynamics rules derived from the consideration of field observations on human social behavior driven by self-confidence and social imitation. This dynamics turns out to be payoff ...

We provide an evolutionary game-theoretical formulation for a model of resource allocation?the Colonel Blotto game. In this game, two players with different total resources must entirely distribute them among a set of ...

In this work we present an evolutionary game inspired by the work of Carlo Cipolla entitled The Basic Laws of Human Stupidity. The game expands the classical scheme of two archetypical strategies, collaborators and defectors, ...

In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases by a ...

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves ...

In this work, we consider an agent-based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero-sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying ...

Structured meaning-signal mappings, i.e., mappings that preserve neighborhood relationships by associating similar signals with similar meanings, are advantageous in an environment where signals are corrupted by noise and ...