Business corporations in the nineteenth century often imposed limits on the voting rights of large shareholders. Economic historians have generally interpreted these voting restrictions as a contractual mechanism designed ...

The nineteenth century saw the standardization and rapid spread of the modern business corporation around the world. Yet those early corporations differed from their contemporary counterparts in important ways. Most ...

We review the corporate takeover regulation in place in the world and find evidence that it is converging from the Market Rule (MR) towards the Equal Opportunity Rule (EOR). The literature on the economic rationale of these ...

We analyse the profile of the boards of directors of 142 Brazilian publicly-held companies in 1999. Directors were divided into four distinct categories, following Bhagat and Black (2000 Working Paper no. 143, Columbia Law ...

Several papers suggest that private benefits can explain the differential pricing between share classes with differential voting rights. However, in Brazil the price differential between voting and non-voting shares has ...

The purpose of the study is to estimate the magnitude of the votes and the excess of votes of the majority shareholders in Brazilian companies grounded by the agency theory. The ownership structure of Brazilian organizations ...

This paper presents a simple model for dual-class stock shares, in which common shareholders receive both public and private cash flows (i.e. dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred ...

What is the role that governments play as large shareholders of mixed-owned firms? By solving a bargaining model over investment decisions, we unveil two corporate governance effects of the government's activism as a large ...