In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question 'why do bidders drop out,' we define ...

In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by ...

Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limari Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale ...

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative ...

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the ...

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuals can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey ...

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuais can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey ...