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Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
(Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 2009-01)
We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only ...
A note on auctions with compulsory partnership
(EGV EPGE, 2016)
A note on auctions with compulsory partnership
(EGV EPGE, 2016)
Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions
(Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007-03-01)
We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic ...
Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
(Springer, 2008-06)
Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined ...
Auctions with endogenous participation
(Springer Verlag, 2000)
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may ...
A note on auctions with compulsory partnership
(Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2016-12-01)
We study a symmetric, profit share, common value auction with a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at rate (say) 0 < λ < 1. ...
Corruption and auctions
(2006)
We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in ...
Bidding strategies in Brazilian electricity auctions
(Elsevier Sci LtdOxfordInglaterra, 2006)
Information Release in Second–Price Auctions
(School of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrollo, 2015-04)
This paper studies the incentives faced by competing auctioneers who can release information to prospective bidders before bidders choose trading partners. I provide sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of a ...