This paper proposes a two-step procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement (auctions). First, we use a reduced form test to short-list bidders whose bidding behavior is at-odds with competitive ...

In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. ...

We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given. We assume that in case of cheating only the cheater is expelled from the cartel and collusion ...

We consider an infinitely repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to ...

Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. ...

This paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement. The main objective is twofold. First, to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach, and second to apply ...

We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given. We assume that in case of cheating only the cheater is expelled from the cartel and collusion ...