La inducción causal desde la teoría del poder causal de Cheng

Causal induction from Cheng's causal power theory

dc.creatorUribe, Miguel E.
dc.creatorAgudelo, Lina
dc.creatorHernández, Miguel
dc.date2019-04-22T21:42:15Z
dc.date2019-04-22T21:42:15Z
dc.date2014-04-04
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-03T19:08:52Z
dc.date.available2023-10-03T19:08:52Z
dc.identifierUribe, M., Agudelo, L., & Hernández, M. (2014). La inducción causal desde la teoría del poder causal de Cheng. CULTURA EDUCACIÓN Y SOCIEDAD, 5(1). Recuperado a partir de https://revistascientificas.cuc.edu.co/culturaeducacionysociedad/article/view/999
dc.identifier2145-9258, 2389-7724 electrónico
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11323/3077
dc.identifier2389-7724
dc.identifierCorporación Universidad de la Costa
dc.identifier2145-9258
dc.identifierREDICUC - Repositorio CUC
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.cuc.edu.co/
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9168208
dc.descriptionUna de las teorías centrales dentro de la explicación de la inducción causal (i.e. el proceso de inferencia que permite a las personas identificar causas en la cotidianidad) es la Teoría del Poder Causal que Patricia Cheng desarrolló en 1997 y que ha venido defendiendo desde esa época (Cheng, 1997; Holyoak y Cheng, 2011). Dicha teoría pretende superar los tradicionales modelos de mecanismo y los simples modelos de covariación que hasta el momento se consideraban como la explicación del proceso de inducción causal. Sin embargo la complejidad del modelo matemático que la sustenta la ha hecho poco accesible a la comunidad no especializada que se pueda interesar en este campo. El propósito del presente artículo es, entonces, realizar una introducción a la teoría de poder causal en la que se muestra no sólo sus ventajas explicativas frente a los otros modelos, sino una reconstrucción sencilla del modelo matemático que la sustenta.
dc.descriptionOne of the central theories within the explanation of causal induction (ie the process of inference that allows people to identify causes in everyday life) is the Theory of Causal Power that Patricia Cheng developed in 1997 and that she has been defending since that time (Cheng, 1997, Holyoak and Cheng, 2011). This theory aims to overcome the traditional models of mechanism and simple models of covariation that until now were considered as the explanation of the process of causal induction. However, the complexity of the mathematical model that sustains it has made it little accessible to the non-specialized community that may be interested in this field. The purpose of this article is, then, to make an introduction to the theory of causal power in which it is shown not only its explanatory advantages compared to other models, but a simple reconstruction of the mathematical model that sustains it.
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dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherCorporación Universidad de la Costa
dc.relationCULTURA EDUCACIÓN Y SOCIEDAD
dc.relationCULTURA EDUCACIÓN Y SOCIEDAD
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dc.relationCult. Edu. Soc.
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Estados Unidos de América
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.sourceCULTURA EDUCACIÓN Y SOCIEDAD
dc.sourcehttps://revistascientificas.cuc.edu.co/culturaeducacionysociedad/article/view/999
dc.subjectRazonamiento causal
dc.subjectTeoría del poder causal
dc.subjectCausal reasoning
dc.subjectTheory of causal power
dc.titleLa inducción causal desde la teoría del poder causal de Cheng
dc.titleCausal induction from Cheng's causal power theory
dc.typeArtículo de revista
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.typeText
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART
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