dc.contributorUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.creatorLima, Delberis A.
dc.creatorContreras, Javier
dc.creatorPadilha-Feltrin, Antonio
dc.date2014-05-20T15:32:35Z
dc.date2016-10-25T18:08:52Z
dc.date2014-05-20T15:32:35Z
dc.date2016-10-25T18:08:52Z
dc.date2008-02-01
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-06T00:28:31Z
dc.date.available2017-04-06T00:28:31Z
dc.identifierElectric Power Systems Research. Lausanne: Elsevier B.V. Sa, v. 78, n. 2, p. 264-275, 2008.
dc.identifier0378-7796
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11449/41446
dc.identifierhttp://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/11449/41446
dc.identifier10.1016/j.epsr.2007.02.008
dc.identifierWOS:000252654600010
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2007.02.008
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/884150
dc.descriptionThis paper presents an analysis and discussion, based on cooperative game theory, for the allocation of the cost of losses to generators and demands in transmission systems. We construct a cooperative game theory model in which the players are represented by equivalent bilateral exchanges and we search for a unique loss allocation solution, the Core. Other solution concepts, such as the Shapley Value, the Bilateral Shapley Value and the Kernel are also explored. Our main objective is to illustrate why is not possible to find an optimal solution for allocating the cost of losses to the users of a network. Results and relevant conclusions are presented for a 4-bus system and a 14-bus system. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherElsevier B.V. Sa
dc.relationElectric Power Systems Research
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subjectloss allocation
dc.subjectequivalent bilateral exchanges
dc.subjectCore
dc.subjectShapley Value
dc.subjectBilateral Shapley Value
dc.subjectKernel
dc.titleA cooperative game theory analysis for transmission loss allocation
dc.typeOtro


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