Representation in cognitive neuroscience

dc.contributorUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.creatorPereira, A.
dc.creatorRiegler, A.
dc.creatorPeschl, M.
dc.creatorVonStein, A.
dc.date2014-05-20T15:28:41Z
dc.date2016-10-25T18:03:49Z
dc.date2014-05-20T15:28:41Z
dc.date2016-10-25T18:03:49Z
dc.date1999-01-01
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-06T00:08:30Z
dc.date.available2017-04-06T00:08:30Z
dc.identifierUnderstanding Representation In the Cognitive Sciences. New York: Kluwer Academic/plenum Publ, p. 49-56, 1999.
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11449/38451
dc.identifierhttp://acervodigital.unesp.br/handle/11449/38451
dc.identifier10.1007/978-0-585-29605-0_6
dc.identifierWOS:000167102100005
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-29605-0_6
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/881564
dc.descriptionThis article discusses the possible representational nature of two brain cognitive functions: perceptual and executive. Assuming the Newellian definition of representational processes as those that establish an isomorphic relation between two structures, I claim that perceptual processes generate only a partial correspondence (between stimuli properties and brain states) and therefore should not be properly conceived as representational. on the other hand, executive processes encompass the combination of copies (i.e., representations) of perceptual patterns, generating new patterns that subserve behavior. In summary, I criticize the notion of perceptual representations, and propose that brain representational processes are related to executive functions, having a pragmatic dimension.
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherKluwer Academic/plenum Publ
dc.relationUnderstanding Representation In the Cognitive Sciences
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.titleRepresentation in cognitive neuroscience
dc.typeOtro


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