El dolor y su aspecto hedomotivo

dc.contributorAmaya Gómez, Santiago
dc.contributorBarrero Guzmán, Tomás Andrés
dc.creatorAvendaño Morales, José Miguel
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-06T19:29:22Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-07T00:25:26Z
dc.date.available2023-06-06T19:29:22Z
dc.date.available2023-09-07T00:25:26Z
dc.date.created2023-06-06T19:29:22Z
dc.date.issued2023-02-06
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/1992/67251
dc.identifierinstname:Universidad de los Andes
dc.identifierreponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
dc.identifierrepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8727383
dc.description.abstractEn su artículo "The Imperative View of Pain" David Bain rechaza la idea de que el dolor es un comando experiencial. Para este filósofo no es claro cómo el imperativismo o los comandos imperativos explican el carácter desagradable y aversivo del dolor. De esta manera, Bain plantea el "reto hedomotivo", la tarea filosófica de comprender la naturaleza y relación entre el tono hedónico y la fuerza motivacional del dolor. Aunque Bain destaca la noción de intensidad a favor del imperativismo, también critica su falta de capacidad explicativa en términos de la experiencia desagradable del dolor. Para dar respuesta a este reto, este artículo examina diferentes teorías filosóficas del dolor y aboga por una perspectiva evaluativa para comprender su naturaleza.
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad de los Andes
dc.publisherFilosofía
dc.publisherFacultad de Ciencias Sociales
dc.publisherDepartamento de Filosofía
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dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.titleEl dolor y su aspecto hedomotivo
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Pregrado


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