Relativismo epistémico y circularidad
Epistemic relativism and circularity
| dc.creator | Piedrahita, Oscar A. | |
| dc.date | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 | |
| dc.date | 2021-02-04T14:54:56Z | |
| dc.date | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 | |
| dc.date | 2021-02-04T14:54:56Z | |
| dc.date | 2020-01-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-09-06T18:36:56Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-09-06T18:36:56Z | |
| dc.identifier | 0124-6127 | |
| dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3 | |
| dc.identifier | https://repositorio.ucaldas.edu.co/handle/ucaldas/15462 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3 | |
| dc.identifier | 2462-9596 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8700028 | |
| dc.description | En este artículo, reviso el reciente intento de Steven Bland de refutar el relativismo epistémico por medio de un argumento dialéctico que prueba de manera no circular la confiabilidad objetiva de los sistemas epistémicos naturalistas. Antes de abordar el argumento de Bland, presento la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad y su relación con el relativismo epistémico. Concluyo argumentando que el intento de Bland de refutar el relativismo debe explicar cómo y por qué los compromisos con nuestros sistemas epistémicos deberían llevarnos a juzgar su confiabilidad. | |
| dc.description | In this paper, I review Steven Bland’s recent attempt to refute epistemic relativism by means of a dialectical argument that proves non-circularly the objective reliability of naturalistic epistemic systems. Before addressing Bland’s argument, I present the incommensurability thesis and its relation to epistemic relativism. I conclude by arguing that Bland’s attempt to refute relativism must explain how and why the commitments to our epistemic systems should lead us to judge their reliability. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Universidad de Caldas | |
| dc.relation | 37 | |
| dc.relation | 36 | |
| dc.relation | 25 | |
| dc.relation | 21 | |
| dc.relation | Discusiones Filosóficas | |
| dc.relation | Barnes, Barry and David Bloor. “Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge”. Rationality and Relativism. Eds. Martin.Hollis and Steven.Lukes. Oxford: Basil-Blackwell, 1982. 21-47. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Bland, Steven. “Circularity, scepticism and epistemic relativism”. Social epistemology,30.2 (2016): 150–162. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Bland, Steven. Epistemic relativism and scepticism. Unwinding the braid. Cham: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2018. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Bloor, David. “Epistemic grace: antirelativism as theology in disguise”. Common knowledge,13.2–3 (2007): 250–280. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Boghossian, Paul. Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism. Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2006. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Carter, J. Adam. Metaepistemology and relativism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Coliva, Annalisa. “Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?” Philosophical Investigations, 33 (2010): 1-23. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Kölbel, Max. “Faultless disagreement”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian society,104 (2003): 53–73. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Kusch, Martin. “Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism”. Synthese,194.12, (2017): 4687–4703. Print. | |
| dc.relation | MacFarlane, John. Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Pritchard, Duncan. “Defusing epistemic relativism”. Synthese,166.2 (2009): 397–412. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Pritchard, Duncan. (2010) “Epistemic relativism, epistemic incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian epistemology”. A companion to relativism. Ed. Steven D.Hales. Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2010.266–285. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Print. | |
| dc.relation | Seidel, Marcus. Epistemic relativism: a constructive critique. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave- Macmillan, 2014. Print | |
| dc.relation | Núm. 36 , Año 2020 : Enero - Junio | |
| dc.relation | https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/2531/2342 | |
| dc.rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |
| dc.source | https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2531 | |
| dc.subject | Relativism | |
| dc.subject | Circularity | |
| dc.subject | Incommensurability | |
| dc.subject | Justification | |
| dc.subject | relativismo | |
| dc.subject | circularidad | |
| dc.subject | inconmensurabilidad | |
| dc.subject | justificación | |
| dc.title | Relativismo epistémico y circularidad | |
| dc.title | Epistemic relativism and circularity | |
| dc.type | Sección Artículos | |
| dc.type | Artículo de revista | |
| dc.type | Journal Article | |
| dc.type | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |
| dc.type | Text | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
| dc.type | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |