La plausibilidad conceptual del dualismo mente-cuerpo. Una nueva defensa del argumento modal

The conceptual plausibility of mind-body dualism. A new defense of the modal argument

dc.creatorGuirado, Matías Alejandro
dc.date2016-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date2016-01-01 00:00:00
dc.date2015-01-01
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T18:36:37Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T18:36:37Z
dc.identifier0124-6127
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2016.17.28.7.
dc.identifier10.17151/difil.2016.17.28.7.
dc.identifier2462-9596
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8699952
dc.descriptionLa principal objeción contra al dualismo cartesiano en filosofía de la mente es que resulta incompatible con la ciencia. Se sostiene, en particular, que el principio de clausura causal del mundo físico y el teorema de preservación de la energía, así como el concepto de interacción dinámica de la física fundamental, desautorizan la postulación de interacciones causales entre sustancias pensantes y sustancias extensas. En este trabajo sostengo que esta conclusión es por lo menos apresurada y que no es un asunto trivial refutar el dualismo cartesiano usando consideraciones empíricas. Mis tesis son: (i) que las críticas antidualistas basadas en premisas científicas colapsan en un reduccionismo metafísicamente implausible y (ii) que la teoría física no excluye la existencia de una relación de causación o interacción dinámica recurrente como la que se requiere para explicar la experiencia consciente, postulando un nexo pertinente entre mentes inmateriales y sistemas nerviosos.
dc.descriptionThe main objection against Cartesian dualism in Philosophy of Mind is that it is incompatible with science. It has been argued, in particular, that the principle of causal closure of the physical world and the theorem of preservation of energy –as well as the concept of dynamic interaction of fundamental physics– overrule the postulation of causal interactions between thinking substances and extended ones. In this paper I argue that this conclusion is at least hasty and that it is not a trivial issue to refute Cartesian dualism by using empirical considerations. My theses are: (i) that the antidualistic criticisms based on scientific premises collapse into a metaphysically implausible reductionism; and (ii) that physical theory does not preclude the existence of a relation of causation or recurrent dynamic interaction as the one required in order to explain the conscious experience by postulating a pertinent link between immaterial minds and nervous systems.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldas
dc.relation134
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dc.relation115
dc.relation17
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dc.relationNúm. 28 , Año 2016 : Enero - Junio
dc.relationhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/2959/2735
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2016 Discusiones Filosóficas
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2959
dc.subjectDualism
dc.subjectmind-body problem
dc.subjectcausality
dc.subjectphysicalism
dc.subjectlaws of nature
dc.subjectDualismo
dc.subjectproblema mente-cuerpo
dc.subjectcausalidad
dc.subjectfisicalismo
dc.subjectleyes naturales
dc.titleLa plausibilidad conceptual del dualismo mente-cuerpo. Una nueva defensa del argumento modal
dc.titleThe conceptual plausibility of mind-body dualism. A new defense of the modal argument
dc.typeArtículo de revista
dc.typeSección Artículos
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.typeText
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85


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