O modelo ontológico estratificado no naturalismo biológico de John Searle: uma controvérsia com Jaegwon Kim.

Ontological model stratified in the naturalism biological of John Searle: a dispute with Jaegwon Kim

dc.creatorde Athayde Prata, Tárik
dc.date2012-12-21 00:00:00
dc.date2012-12-21 00:00:00
dc.date2012-12-21
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-06T18:33:57Z
dc.date.available2023-09-06T18:33:57Z
dc.identifier0124-6127
dc.identifierhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/676
dc.identifier2462-9596
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8699314
dc.descriptionO artigo discute a controvérsia entre Jaegwon Kim (1934-) e John Searle (1932-) a respeito do modo como este  último utiliza o modelo ontológico estratificado em sua filosofia da mente. Após uma exposição e discussão  geral desse modelo (seção 2), são discutidas as respostas de Searle a duas das críticas de Kim ao naturalismo  biológico (seção 3). Apesar de usar o modelo estratificado e tentar construir um fisicalismo não redutivo, Searle  recai em um dualismo de propriedades (seção 4).
dc.descriptionThis paper discusses the controversy between Jaegwon Kim (1934-) and John Searle (1932-) about the way the  latter uses the ontological layered model in his philosophy of mind. After an exposition and a general discussion of such model (section 2), Searle’s answers to some of Kim’s criticisms to biological naturalism are discussed  (section 3). Even though Searle uses a layered model and tries to construct a nonreductive physicalism, he ends  up recalling a property dualism.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Caldas
dc.relation137
dc.relation21
dc.relation119
dc.relation13
dc.relationDiscusiones Filosóficas
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dc.relationNúm. 21 , Año 2012 : Julio - Diciembre
dc.relationhttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/676/599
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2012 Discusiones Filosóficas
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.sourcehttps://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/676
dc.subjectJaegwon Kim
dc.subjectJohn Searle
dc.subjectlevels of complexity
dc.subjectontology
dc.subjectmind-body problem
dc.subjectJaegwon Kim
dc.subjectJohn Searle
dc.subjectníveis de complexidade
dc.subjectontologia
dc.subjectproblema mente-corpo
dc.titleO modelo ontológico estratificado no naturalismo biológico de John Searle: uma controvérsia com Jaegwon Kim.
dc.titleOntological model stratified in the naturalism biological of John Searle: a dispute with Jaegwon Kim
dc.typeArtículo de revista
dc.typeSección Artículos
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.typeText
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85


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